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ADJUDICATED JUVENILES AND COLLATERAL
RELIEF
Joshua A. Tepfer* & Laura H. Nirider**
I. INTRODUCTION
Collateral relief is a vital part of the American criminal justice system. By
filing post-conviction petitions after the close of direct appeal, defendants can raise
claims based on evidence outside the record that was not known or available at the
time of trial. One common use of post-conviction relief is to file a claim related to
a previously unknown constitutional violation that occurred at trial, such as
ineffective assistance of counsel. If a defendant’s trial attorney performed
ineffectively by failing to call, for instance, an alibi witness, then that omission is
unlikely to be reflected in the trial record—but in post-conviction proceedings, the
defendant may seek to expand the record to include evidence of such
ineffectiveness. If a court, sitting in post-conviction, hears that evidence and sides
with the defendant, the usual remedy is to grant a new trial. Without access to the
opportunities to supplement the record that are afforded by these collateral
proceedings, however, a defendant who suffers ineffective assistance of counsel
often has no opportunity for relief.
Collateral proceedings are also often used to raise newly discovered evidence
of innocence. This use of post-conviction proceedings, in particular, has met with
much success, especially since the development of DNA technology has enabled
attorneys to subject trial evidence to scientific testing and to introduce the test
results as newly discovered evidence of innocence. To date, 291 individuals have
been exonerated by DNA testing,1 all of it conducted through collateral
proceedings. Each of these individuals stands as living proof of the fact that access
to post-conviction relief is an essential part of a justice-seeking judicial system.
This article examines the troubling disparities in access to collateral relief
between criminal and juvenile court that appear to occur in many jurisdictions.
Some states explicitly make collateral relief unavailable to defendants who are tried
as juveniles, even while granting such access to adults. In many other states,
legislatures have drafted laws governing the availability of post-conviction relief
that are vague and ambiguous, leading to uncertainty about whether adjudicated
juveniles may take advantage of such proceedings. This disparity exists despite the
fact that those tried in juvenile court need access to collateral remedies just as much
as those tried in adult court.
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Project CoDirector, Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University
School of Law. The authors thank Steven Drizin for reviewing drafts of this article and providing
helpful comments. This article would not have been completed without the invaluable research
assistance of our students at Northwestern University School of Law: Lauren Hillemann, Sydney
Schneider, Rebecca Stephens, Christine Terada, and Hannah Wendling.
** Adjunct Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Project Co-Director, Center on
Wrongful Convictions of Youth, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org (last visited May 25, 2012).
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Part II of this article explains that individuals adjudicated in juvenile court may
be in particular need of collateral remedies, while demonstrating that their access to
these remedies is far too often unclear, severely limited, or explicitly denied. Part
III offers two examples of real-life juvenile defendants who either were or would
have been harmed by the unavailability of collateral relief. Part IV concludes with
a call for clarity and increased juvenile access to collateral proceedings nationwide.
II. JUVENILES AND POST-ADJUDICATION LITIGATION
A. Adjudicated Juveniles Need Collateral Relief
The ability to invoke collateral relief is critical for adjudicated juveniles.
Youth have been shown to be especially vulnerable as a population to wrongful
conviction—and, in particular, to false confession. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized on several occasions, juveniles are categorically less mature, less able
to weigh risks and long-term consequences, more vulnerable to external pressures,
and more compliant with authority figures than are adults.2 The Court has
concluded, in turn, that these youthful traits mean that the risk of false confession is
“all the more troubling” and “all the more acute” when the “subject of a custodial
interrogation is a juvenile.”3 This conclusion has roots that extend back to the 1967
Supreme Court case In re Gault, in which the Supreme Court explained that
“authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability and
trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children.”4
A slew of empirical studies have affirmed the accuracy of this conclusion. The
leading study of 125 proven false confession cases, cited by the Supreme Court in
Corley v. United States and J.D.B. v. North Carolina, found that 63% of false
confessors were under the age of twenty-five and 32% were under eighteen.5 By
way of comparison, contemporaneous statistics reveal that juveniles made up only
8% of the individuals arrested for murder and 16% of the individuals arrested for
rape in the United States.6 In another respected study of 340 exonerations that have

2. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27
(2010).
3. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011). See also Corley v. United States, 556
U.S. 303, 320-21 (2009) (“[T]here is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures [associated with
custodial interrogation] can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they
never committed”) (citations omitted).
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 52 (1967). While Gault may be the first explicit example of the U.S.
Supreme Court questioning the reliability of statements made by juveniles during custodial
interrogation, the Court previously had questioned the voluntariness of juvenile statements made during
intensive interrogation. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (“A 15-year old lad,
questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men
possibly might stand the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we cannot believe that a lad of tender years
is a match for the police in such a contest”); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (“[A] 14year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him
when he is made accessible only to the police [for interrogation]”).
5. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,
82 N.C.L. REV. 891, 945 (2004).
6. HOWARD N. SNYDER, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
ARRESTS 2004, at 2 (2006), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/214563.pdf.
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taken place since 1989, researchers found that juveniles under the age of eighteen
were three times as likely to falsely confess as adults; a full 42% of juvenile
exonerees in that study had falsely confessed, compared to only 13% of wrongfully
convicted adults.7 And the most recent study addressing the subject—an
examination of 103 wrongful convictions of factually innocent teenagers and
children—found that a false confession contributed to 31.1% of the juvenile cases
studied, as compared against only 17.8% of adult wrongful convictions.8
Laboratory studies, moreover, have replicated these real-world empirics. In one
study, a majority of juvenile participants complied with a request to sign a false
confession without uttering a word of protest.9 The study concluded that juveniles
between the ages of twelve and sixteen were far more likely to falsely confess than
young adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six.10
This higher incidence of false confessions among juveniles exists because
standard police tactics—which in all probability were designed with the hardened
adult suspect in mind—are frequently deployed against far softer targets: children
and adolescents.11 Despite their common use during interrogations of children and
adolescents, however, these tactics pose a particular risk to young suspects. In
recognition of this fact, even John E. Reid & Associates—the leading police
interrogation training firm in the country—recommends “special caution” when
interrogating children.12 Sadly, this recommendation goes underemphasized in
Reid’s interrogation manual and trainings, and is rarely implemented in real life.
The problem of false confessions from children is particularly troubling
because once a defendant has confessed, his or her conviction is all but guaranteed.
Despite substantial evidence to the contrary, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and even
some defense attorneys continue to adhere to the misapprehension that individuals
do not confess to crimes they did not commit, resulting in wrongful prosecutions
and convictions. Indeed, one Supreme Court justice has recognized that, for all
practical purposes, “the introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a
trial in court superfluous”—a statement that holds true even for those who have
falsely confessed.13 Confessions can be so prejudicial that they can persuade jurors
to convict despite the existence of significant exculpatory evidence, such as
conflicting physical evidence, contradictory accounts from witnesses, and alibis.14

7. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545 (2005).
8. Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider, & Lynda Tricarico, Arresting Development: Convictions of
Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904 (2010).
9. See Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed:
The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 150-51 (2003).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding
Juvenile Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV. SCI. L. 757, 759 (2007).
12. JOHN E. REID & ASSOCS., INC, CLARIFYING MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE REID TECHNIQUE 1
(2012), available at www.reid.com/pdfs/20120311.pdf.
13. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting E. CLEARY,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed. 1972)). See Drizin & Leo, supra note 5, at 958 (81% of false
confessors who took their cases to trial were convicted).
14. See Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can
Confessions Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 122, 122 (2009).
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While the research on juvenile wrongful convictions is best developed in the
arena of false confessions, there is reason to believe that youth may be particularly
vulnerable to other types of evidentiary problems and errors that can also lead to
wrongful convictions. Crimes involving youth often happen in groups, and the
witnesses presented against children are often children themselves.15 Those
youthful witnesses may be particularly vulnerable even to unintentional suggestion
during line-ups and other eyewitness identification procedures, due to an inherent
desire to please authority figures or a simple desire to end the unpleasant
experience of being at the police station.16 All this is to say, in short, that no matter
in which court their cases are tried, the mere fact of youthfulness makes children
and teens more likely to be wrongfully convicted. As it so happens, most cases
involving teens end up in juvenile court.
This fact, however, presents a second problem. The peculiar institution of
juvenile court itself can be a “breeding ground” for wrongful convictions and
constitutional violations, including ineffective assistance of counsel.17 Juvenile
court originated as an institution at the turn of the twentieth century, when
reformers envisioned a body that would handle young people’s transgressions with
an eye to rehabilitation and treatment, rather than punishment and long-term
incarceration.18 To facilitate this emphasis on rehabilitation, some of the
adversarial aspects of adult criminal court were removed from juvenile court; for
instance, all individuals in the courtroom—prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges alike—were conceived of as benevolent actors seeking to promote
children’s “best interests” and welfare.19
Unfortunately, these well-intentioned features of juvenile court, over time,
have bred a court culture that today discourages and sometimes precludes zealous
and adversarial advocacy.20 Many juvenile courts continue to view zealous
advocacy as “antithetical to rehabilitation.”21 Some attorneys, believing that their
clients will be best served by submitting to the consequences of a juvenile
adjudication, may fail to research and investigate cases even when their clients
request it.22 They may fail to interview witnesses or visit the crime scene; they
may omit to file pre-trial motions; and they may even arrive at dispositional
hearings unprepared.23 Scholars have suggested that ineffective assistance of
counsel, sadly, is “routine and widespread” in this context.24 Without post15. Tepfer et al., supra note 8, at 908-10.
16. Id. at 921.
17. See Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257 (2007).
18. See id. at 262.
19. See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
MINN. L. REV. 141, 150 (1984).
20. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (noting that juvenile court
proceedings lack the “fully adversary” character of adult criminal trials).
21. Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth Continue to Pay
the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 543, 555 (2009).
22. See Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 794-95 (2010).
23. Id. at 792-93.
24. Id. at 791.
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adjudication access, however, much of this ineffectiveness may never be remedied.
The apparent prevalence of ineffectiveness in juvenile court, in turn, circles
back to an increased risk of wrongful convictions.25 By discouraging juvenile
defenders from zealously subjecting the State’s claims to the full-blown “crucible
of meaningful adversarial testing,” juvenile court culture makes reliability a
secondary concern.26 In effect, accurate fact-finding can be subordinated to the
attorney’s or court’s perception of the child’s best interests and need for
treatment.27
Because of the potential for ineffective assistance of counsel and the
susceptibility of juvenile defendants to wrongful conviction, it is imperative to
ensure that adjudicated juveniles have access to collateral relief that will allow
them to raise and remedy these issues in court. Although adjudicated juveniles
may not suffer penal consequences directly on par with convicted criminals in adult
court, they can still be detained and sentenced for prolonged periods of time.
Adjudications of delinquency, moreover, can and often do have far-reaching
secondary consequences, such as lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles
who have been adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses,28 restrictions from
serving in the military,29 eviction from public housing,30 and immigration-related
penalties.31 Unfortunately, however, the nature and extent of juveniles’ access to
collateral relief is far from clear in many jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions,
moreover, such access is explicitly denied.
B. National Outlook: Access Unclear
Efforts to prove innocence after conviction are ubiquitous in jurisdictions all
over the country. By far, the most generally accepted means of belatedly proving
innocence is through DNA testing. Since the nation’s first DNA exoneration in
1989, individuals have been exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing in
thirty-six states.32 Forty-nine states,33 the District of Columbia,34 and the federal
25. See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting) (juvenile
adjudications “may well lack the reliability of real convictions in criminal courts”).
26. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
27. Majd & Puritz, supra note 21, at 555-56 (describing reports that juvenile courts and judges place
a “premium” on “maintaining a friendly atmosphere” that discourages some attorneys from filing
motions or pursuing defenses).
28. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A)(3)(a), (5) (2010); In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747
(Ill. 2003).
29. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 601-210, ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS ENLISTMENT
PROGRAM ¶¶ 4-4, 4-32 (2011).
30. See Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (upholding the practice
of evicting tenants from public housing due to their illegal conduct).
31. See Wallace v. Gonzalez, 463 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ consideration of a prior juvenile adjudication in deciding whether to grant an alien’s
application for adjustment of status).
32. Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/
(last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
33. Oklahoma is the only state that does not have a DNA testing statute. See infra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text. Until this year, Massachusetts also lacked a post-conviction DNA testing statute,
but a new law was signed by the Governor on February 17, 2012. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278A
(effective May 17, 2012).

2012]

ADJUDICATED JUVENILES AND COLLATERAL RELIEF

559

government35 have post-conviction DNA testing statutes on the books. Although
these DNA testing laws have enabled 291 convicted individuals to be proven
innocent, not a single one of those individuals had been adjudicated delinquent in
juvenile court, despite the fact that every jurisdiction has a separate juvenile court
system.36
A closer look at the various post-conviction DNA statutes may offer at least
one explanation. Of the fifty jurisdictions that have post-conviction DNA testing
statutes, only five—Colorado,37 the District of Columbia,38 New Hampshire,39
South Carolina,40 and Wisconsin41—explicitly allow young people who have been
adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court to seek relief under those statutes. While
the remaining jurisdictions’ statutes do not directly address juvenile access to postadjudication DNA testing, there are strong reasons to believe that juveniles may not
seek relief under many of those statutes.
The vast majority of DNA testing statutes share a common wording that limits
access to those “convicted of” a crime or felony. Forty-one jurisdictions use this
language or something similar.42 This wording, however, may have the effect of
34. See D.C. CODE § 22-4133 (2012).
35. See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004).
36. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30822, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS AND
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT AND RELATED MATTERS
(2004), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/1143.pdf (discussing scope
of federal juvenile jurisdiction); Carol S. Stevenson et al., The Juvenile Court: Analysis and
Recommendations,
THE
JUVENILE
COURT,
Winter
1996,
at
4,
available
at
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/06_03_Analysis.pdf (all fifty states have a
juvenile court system); COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, GUIDE TO THE D.C. JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM
(2009),
available
at
http://www.courtexcellence.org/uploads/publications/
DCJuvenileJusticeGuideEnglish_Final.pdf (discussing the District of Columbia’s juvenile court
system).
37. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-411(d) (2012) (including an individual incarcerated in “a juvenile
facility following adjudication for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult”
among those who may access the statute).
38. D.C. CODE § 22-4133 (including those “adjudicated as a delinquent”).
39. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-D:2 (2012) (providing access after “adjudication as a delinquent”).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30 (2012) (including those “adjudicated delinquent”).
41. WIS. STAT. § 974.07 (2012) (including those “adjudicated delinquent”).
42. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2012)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (West
2012)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-20 (West 2012)), California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405
(West 2012)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (West 2012)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2012)), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2012)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41
(West 2012)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-121 (2012)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4901
(West 2012)), Illinois (725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/166-3 (2012)), Indiana (IND. CODE. § 35-38-7-5 (2012)),
Iowa (IOWA CODE § 81.10 (2012)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2012)), Louisiana (LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 926.1 (West 2012)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2137 (2012)), Maryland (MD. CODE
ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2012)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16 (2012)), Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2012)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-110 (West 2012)), Nebraska
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120 (2012)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.0918 (2012)), New Jersey (N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2012)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (West 2012)),
North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2012)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-15
(2012)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.71-.84 (West 2012)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 136.690
(2012)), Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2012)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-12
(2012)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2012)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30303 (2012)), Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01 (West 2012)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §
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excluding young people who have been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court.43
State and federal laws generally draw a clear distinction between a “conviction” in
criminal court and an “adjudication” in juvenile court.44 Take, for example,
California law, which holds that “an order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the
juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose.”45 At
the same time, California’s post-conviction DNA testing statute limits access to any
person “convicted of a felony.”46 Under basic principles of statutory construction,
it is difficult to imagine that an adjudicated juvenile is encompassed within the
DNA statute.47
78B-9-300 (West 2012)), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5561 (West 2012)), Virginia (VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (West 2012)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2012)), West Virginia
(W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-14 (2012)), Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-301 (West 2012)). See also
infra note 47 for a discussion of Florida, Idaho, and Rhode Island’s statutes, which are worded slightly
differently and may present different issues of statutory interpretation.
Alabama and Kentucky limit their post-conviction DNA testing to individuals convicted of a
“capital offense.” ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (2012); KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285 (West 2012).
Although an adjudicated delinquent could never receive a “capital sentence,” it appears under those
states’ definitions that a juvenile could be adjudicated of a capital offense. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39
(2012) (Alabama defining a capital offense as “[a]n offense for which a defendant shall be punished by
a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole according to the provisions of this article”); KY
REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040 (West 2011) (noting that a youthful offender can be adjudicated of a capital
offense). The same question lingers regarding whether an “adjudication” of a capital offense would be
deemed the same thing as a “conviction” of a capital offense. See infra notes 44-46.
43. It is fairly clear that juveniles who are charged and convicted in adult criminal court or who are
otherwise given an adult sentence would be allowed to access DNA testing statutes. See e.g., N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-18(C) (West 2012) (“If a judgment on a proceeding under the Delinquency Act
results in an adult sentence, the determination of guilt at trial becomes a conviction for purposes of the
Criminal Code.”).
44. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d 134, 147 (Ill. 2006) (holding that a juvenile who escapes
from detention after an adjudication of delinquency cannot be convicted under an escape statute that
limits its application to those “convicted of a felony”); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220
(10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that juvenile delinquency is “an adjudication of status--not a criminal
conviction”).
45. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West 2012).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2012).
47. At least three states use language that, while ambiguous as to whether it includes adjudicated
juveniles, may allow for better statutory interpretation arguments to the effect that it does. Mississippi
grants access to “any person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi”; Missouri allows
“a person in the custody of the department of corrections” to file a motion; and New York states merely
that a “defendant” may bring a motion. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5 (West 2012); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 547.035 (2012); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1a) (McKinney 2012). The question in these states
turns not on whether an “adjudication” is the same thing as a “conviction,” but on whether an
adjudicated juvenile is “sentenced by a court of record” to “the department of corrections” or whether a
charged and adjudicated juvenile was a “defendant.”
Two states use statutory language that grants access to individuals “convicted of or sentenced”
in connection with a crime or felony. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4901 (West 2012); R.I. GEN LAWS §
10-9.1-12 (2012) (italics added). Juvenile petitioners in these states may claim that they fall within
these statutes by arguing that they were “sentenced,” even if they were not technically “convicted.” But
see United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 169 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Under the New Jersey Code of
Juvenile Justice, juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent are not sentenced but rather are subject to a
‘dispositional hearing.’” (citations omitted)); In re J.J.M., 701 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(adjudicated juveniles are neither convicted nor given sentences). The vast majority of state statutes in
which the term “sentencing” appears, however, use the conjunction “and,” which does not appear to aid
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The structure of the Maine statutory scheme suggests the same conclusion.
Access to post-conviction DNA testing in Maine is governed by title 15, section
2138 of the Maine Revised Statutes, which allows “a person convicted of and
sentenced for” certain crimes to seek testing.48 The statute does delineate those
who may seek relief—such as individuals who are on parole—but adjudicated
juveniles are not mentioned.49 Even further, Maine statutes and case law make
clear that a delinquency adjudication is not the equivalent of a felony conviction.50
And the Maine statute governing non-DNA post-conviction claims for relief
specifies clearly that adjudicated juveniles may seek relief under that statute—thus
suggesting an intentional contrast between the scopes of the non-DNA and DNA
post-conviction statutes.51 While there does not appear to be any case law in Maine
addressing this issue,52 this statutory backdrop suggests that adjudicated juveniles
are likely not encompassed within the DNA testing statute.
In fact, there appears to be little case law addressing this precise question in
any jurisdiction. One of the few courts to address the issue—in Texas—has
strongly suggested that juveniles cannot seek DNA testing when the DNA testing
statute limits relief to those who have been “convicted.” Texas’ post-conviction
DNA testing statute is found at article 64.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which allows a “convicted person” to seek testing.53 In the case of In re R.J.M.,54 a
juvenile sought leave to seek relief under this statute after his adjudication for
aggravated sexual assault. The lower court denied the motion, finding that there
were “no reasonable grounds for a motion to be filed.”55 In dismissing the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court noted that the legislature did not
explicitly authorize a juvenile’s appeal of a denial of such a motion.56 The court
explained that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not generally apply to
adjudicated juveniles unless the legislature specifically “evinces a contrary
intent.”57 It went on to note that no contrary intent appears in the DNA testing

the statutory argument. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (West 2012) (limited to individuals
“convicted of and sentenced for”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (“convicted of a crime and sentenced
to”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-121 (2012) (“convicted of and sentenced for”); ME. REV. STAT. tit 15, §
2138 (2012) (“convicted of and sentenced for”). One state, Florida, presents a similar issue: its statute
permits DNA testing for those who have been “found guilty,” which could arguably include adjudicated
juveniles. See FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2012); A.S.F. v. State, 70 So. 3d 754, 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (referencing a juvenile who was “found guilty” of a crime); but see State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105,
111 (Fla. 2002) (if the legislature had intended to include adjudicated juveniles within the scope of a
different Act, it could have specifically said so).
48. ME. REV. STAT. tit 15, § 2138 (2012).
49. Id. § 2138(1).
50. Id. § 3310(6); State v. Brockelbank, 2011 ME 118, 33 A.3d 925.
51. ME. REV. STAT. tit 15, §§ 2121-32. Specifically, see section 2121(1), specifying that a
“criminal judgment” includes an “adjudication and disposition in a juvenile case.”
52. Only two published appellate cases address the post-conviction DNA statute in Maine. See
Cookson v. State, 2011 ME 53, 17 A.3d 1208; State v. Donovan, 2004 ME 81, 853 A.2d 772. Neither
addresses this issue.
53. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a-1) (West 2012).
54. 211 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
55. Id. at 394.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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statute; rather, that statute is limited to those who have been “convicted,” and the
Texas Family Code specifically states that “an order of an adjudication . . . is not a
conviction of crime.”58 Although the specific holding in this case was that an
adjudicated juvenile cannot appeal the denial of a DNA testing motion, the
decision strongly suggests that an adjudicated juvenile also cannot file such a
motion in the first place.
Beyond the fundamental unfairness of not allowing adjudicated juveniles
opportunities to prove their innocence, the apparent lack of juvenile access to postconviction DNA testing in most jurisdictions also creates a troubling contradiction.
The vast majority of states require juveniles to contribute a DNA sample to the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)—a national DNA database developed to
assist state and federal law enforcement agencies—after an adjudication of guilt in
juvenile court.59 For example, Kentucky and California, which appear to deny
juveniles the right to seek post-conviction DNA testing, still require adjudicated
juveniles to submit their DNA profiles into CODIS.60 These statutory schemes
create an odd dichotomy: juveniles’ DNA can be used only to prove their guilt, not
their innocence.
Statutes and rules governing the availability of other, non-DNA forms of
collateral relief—such as state-level writs of habeas corpus—often suffer from the
same infirmity as DNA statutes: in many jurisdictions, it remains uncertain as to
whether such relief is available to adjudicated juveniles. For example, Arizona
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 provides one method for pursuing state-level postconviction relief; as with the vast majority of DNA testing statutes, however, this
provision limits access to those who have been “convicted” of a criminal offense.61
Indeed, the Arizona statute explicitly lists several categories of defendants who are
permitted to file under this section—such as those who have violated probation—
yet it omits to mention adjudicated juveniles.62 Given this statutory backdrop, it is
unclear, if not unlikely, that this provision is applicable to adjudicated juveniles. In
other states, including North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, it is
equally doubtful that adjudicated juveniles may seek relief for similar reasons.63
Although some states explicitly allow equal access64—including Maine, as
58. Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.13 (a) (2005)).
59. See SETH AXELRAD, AM. SOC’Y OF LAW, MED. & ETHICS, SURVEY OF STATE DNA DATABASE
STATUTES (2004), available at http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/guide.pdf. The same information is
also available in spreadsheet form at http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/ statute_grid_4_5_2006.html.
60. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.174 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 296 (West 2012).
61. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1.
62. Id.
63. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-01 (2012) (limiting access to post-conviction procedures to
persons “convicted of and sentenced for a crime”); OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.400 (2012) (limited to
persons “convicted of a crime”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2012) (limiting post-conviction relief to
persons “convicted of a crime”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (2012) (limiting post-conviction relief to
persons “convicted of or sentenced for” a crime).
64. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-12-23(b) (2012) (allowing judges to appoint counsel for adjudicated
juveniles seeking habeas corpus or other collateral relief); D.C. CODE § 16-2335.01(a) (2012) (allowing
adjudicated juveniles to seek a new hearing on the grounds of actual innocence); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.21 (West 2012) (allowing “any person convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a
delinquent child” to pursue collateral relief); In re Interest of J.M., 246 A.2d 536, 538-39 (N.J. Juv. &
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1968) (allowing the delinquent juvenile collateral relief); Robinson v. Boley State Sch.

2012]

ADJUDICATED JUVENILES AND COLLATERAL RELIEF

563

outlined above—a handful of states throughout the country explicitly prohibit
adjudicated juveniles from seeking state-court collateral remedies. For example,
adjudicated juveniles in Illinois are not permitted to seek relief pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the traditional means by which convicted adults raise
non-forensic actual innocence claims and other constitutional violations.65
Similarly, neither Arkansas66 nor Texas67 juveniles have access to state habeas
corpus relief.
The South Carolina statutory scheme also appears to prohibit adjudicated
juveniles from seeking non-DNA collateral relief. Recall that South Carolina was
one of only five states to explicitly include juveniles in its post-conviction DNA
testing statute.68 Conversely, South Carolina’s Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act limits access to non-forensic collateral relief to those persons who have been
“convicted” of a crime.69 The legislature’s failure to explicitly mention adjudicated
juveniles in this statute when it had done so in the DNA context strongly suggests
that juveniles do not have access to non-DNA collateral remedies.
Other statutory schemes provide some means for adjudicated juveniles to seek
collateral remedies, even while limiting their access to a greater degree than
similarly situated adults. Consider Illinois, which prohibits juvenile access to the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act as explained above, but which does allow adults and
juveniles alike to seek relief from judgments based on errors of fact.70 Although
adult criminal defendants must seek this type of relief within the two-year period
following their convictions,71 the Illinois statutory scheme allows adjudicated
juveniles only one year to pursue equivalent relief.72 There is no apparent reason
for this discrepancy.
In short, most jurisdictions have not established clear rules as to whether
adjudicated juveniles have the same rights as adults to seek relief through collateral
proceedings. Despite this lack of clarity, there is good reason to believe that access
to all forms of collateral relief is severely limited for many adjudicated juveniles
across the country. As exemplified by the two Illinois case studies below, these
limitations are, or can be, disastrous.

for Boys, 554 P.2d 44, 46 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that as a matter of equal protection,
juveniles must be afforded access to post-conviction procedures); State ex rel. R.S. v. Trent, 289 S.E.2d
166, 177 (W. Va. 1982) (granting state habeas relief to a West Virginia juvenile).
65. See In re A.G., 746 N.E.2d 732, 737 (Ill. 2001) (citing In re A.W.H., 420 N.E.2d 1041, 1042-43
(Ill. 1981); In re R.R., 394 N.E.2d 75, 76-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)) (for the proposition that the Illinois
high court has not reviewed lower court decisions holding that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does
not apply to juvenile proceedings). See also People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1332-33 (Ill.
1996) (explaining that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act can be utilized to make claims of actual
innocence and other constitutional violations).
66. Robinson v. Shock, 667 S.W.2d 956, 958-59 (Ark. 1984).
67. Ex parte Valle, 104 S.W.3d 888, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that adjudicated juveniles
cannot request habeas relief because they were not “convicted”).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30(A) (2012).
69. Id. § 17-27-20.
70. People v. Gandy, 591 N.E.2d 45, 64-65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401
(2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-32 (2012).
71. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(c) (2012).
72. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-32 (2012).
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III. CASE STUDIES
A. Alberto M.
In early 1999, Alberto M., a twelve-year-old Latino boy living in Chicago with
his parents, older sister, and two younger brothers, was having a difficult time.73
His mother suffered from depression, anxiety, and possible bipolar disorder,74
while his father abused drugs and alcohol,75 all of which created a volatile home
environment.76 Perhaps in response, Alberto started lashing out and acting
inappropriately, getting in some trouble at school and home. Before long, he
started encountering law enforcement. In March 1999, after an altercation with his
mother, he was arrested for domestic battery.77 The case never made it to court, but
it signaled mounting problems for Alberto.
In May, a distraught Alberto started telling friends that he was going to kill
himself.78 When he was discovered with a rope and a knife, he was admitted to a
children’s hospital, where he received two weeks of intensive psychological
therapy.79 He was also prescribed antidepressants and drugs designed to mitigate
his attention deficit disorder.80
Alberto’s problems multiplied greatly in September, however, when the Cook
County State’s Attorney’s Office filed a petition for adjudication of wardship
against him, alleging that Alberto had committed acts of sexual penetration against
his nine-year-old brother, Evan.81 According to the charges and court records,
Alberto, who by this time had turned thirteen years old, was in his room with his
brother Evan when he became aroused by a female wrestler on the television.82
Alberto then allegedly sexually penetrated his brother.83 Law enforcement became
involved after Evan allegedly told their mother, who alerted Alberto’s therapist,
who then called the police.84 Under questioning, Alberto confessed to committing
these acts, while nine-year-old Evan also allegedly made statements implicating his
brother.85
Outside of law enforcement’s presence, however, Alberto told a far different

73. The authors of this article represented Alberto in later proceedings, as noted infra. Some
information discussed herein arises from their personal knowledge and experience with the case. The
names of Alberto and his younger brother Evan have been changed to protect their identities.
74. Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, Psychiatric Evaluation, A.M., Oct. 27, 2000 [hereinafter
Psychiatric Evaluation, Oct. 27, 2000] (on file with authors); Children’s Memorial Hospital, Discharge
Summary, A.M., Feb. 4, 2000 (on file with authors).
75. Psychiatric Evaluation, Oct. 27, 2000, supra note 74.
76. Children’s Memorial Hospital, Discharge Summary, A.M., May 19, 1999 (on file with authors).
77. Chicago Police Department, Juvenile Summary Report, A.M. (on file with authors); Juvenile
Court of Cook County, Social Investigation, A.M., June 13, 2000, at 4 [hereinafter Social Investigation,
June 13, 2000] (on file with authors).
78. Social Investigation, June 13, 2000, supra note 77, at 6.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Petition for Adjudication of Wardship – Amended, In re A.M., (on file with authors).
82. Social Investigation, June 13, 2000, supra note 77, at 4.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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version of the events that led to his charges. According to Alberto, he and his
brother were swimming nude in a family member’s pool. While they were playing
in the water, they began re-enacting a scene from Mulan, a 1998 animated Disney
film, in which Alberto lifted his younger brother over his head. As they were doing
so, their mother entered the pool area, saw them naked, overreacted, and called the
police. When brought to the police station, Alberto was bombarded with questions
from police officers, who accused him of committing sexual acts against his
brother. After what seemed like hours of constant questioning and the police’s
adamant refusal to accept his denials, Alberto gave in. Scared and confused, he
admitted to what the police were saying he did to his brother. Next thing Alberto
knew, he was shipped off to the detention center and charged with serious crimes in
juvenile court.
Although Alberto was released from detention after just a couple of days, he
wasn’t allowed back home. As the case wound its way through juvenile court, he
was placed in the custody of the pastor of the family’s church.86 Alberto’s
problems, however, continued to escalate. Shortly after the New Year, Alberto was
readmitted to the hospital for a week’s worth of psychological treatment.87 He had
been acting erratically, including episodes of uncontrolled laughter and sobbing,
and teachers reported that he spoke nonsensically at times.88 He also had run away
twice and allegedly had verbally and physically intimidated his guardian.89 To
further complicate matters, his older sister had been hospitalized following her own
suicide attempt just two weeks earlier.90 After his hospital admission, Alberto was
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium.91
At the same time, however, the State’s case against Alberto suffered a
significant setback. Per a court order, Alberto was evaluated by a psychologist,
who determined that Alberto was incapable of knowingly understanding and
waiving his Miranda rights.92 In light of these conclusions, the Cook County
State’s Attorney was in all probability barred from using Alberto’s confession
against him at an adjudicatory hearing. Perhaps in response, the State offered
Alberto a deal: in exchange for dropping seven of the eight allegations, including
the most serious charges, Alberto could plead guilty to one count of sexual conduct
with a family member under the age of eighteen and avoid detention entirely.93
The deal required him to be on probation for five years and do some community
service.94 Alberto’s counsel also explained to him that the deal required his
registration as a sex offender for a period of ten years.95 Given the seriousness of
the charges, his other family and medical problems, and the risk of a long period of
86. Id. at 5.
87. Children’s Memorial Hospital, Discharge Summary, A.M., Jan. 30, 2000 (on file with authors).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The University of Chicago, Psychiatric Evaluation, A.M., Jan. 6, 2000 (on file with authors).
93. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea or Relief from Judgment Pursuant to 705 ILCS 405/2-32, at
Ex. C, In re A.M., (transcript of court proceedings, Apr. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea] (on file with authors).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2 (Affidavit of A.M.).
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detention if he went to trial, Alberto reluctantly decided to take the deal, despite his
private insistence that he was innocent. In mid-2000, Alberto accepted the terms as
read to him by his juvenile court judge and signed a form that required his
registration as a sex offender for ten years. That form was later read into the record
in open court by the prosecutor.96
Over the next year or so, unsurprisingly, Alberto’s psychological and
emotional problems only multiplied. He frequently missed school and counseling
appointments; stopped taking his medications; had multiple violent episodes
involving family members and classmates; and, in mid-2001, after again making
suicidal statements, was hospitalized yet again.97 Over this same time period, his
parents separated and sought a divorce.98 In November, he was arrested on two
separate occasions.99
In early 2002, however, Alberto entered a therapeutic day school and began
treatment with a new counselor.100 Although his improvements were gradual, they
were significant. Over time, Alberto’s violent episodes began to subside. He
improved his grades, attended his counseling sessions, and consistently took his
medication.101
In July 2005, he was discharged from probation, having
satisfactorily met all the requirements.102 The Cook County Juvenile Probation
Department issued a report deeming him unlikely to sexually offend in the future;
and he had not been adjudicated or convicted of any offense—sexual or
otherwise—since his guilty plea in July 2000.103 Alberto had also consistently
complied with his annual sex offender registration duties.104
By his early twenties, it was clear that Alberto had entirely turned his life
around. He had graduated from high school and now had a solid career as a
department head at a home improvement store, enabling him to bring home a
steady and significant paycheck.105 As such, he was the primary means of financial
support for his mother and two younger brothers, including Evan, with whom he
lived.106 He had a committed girlfriend and an older male friend who served as a
close mentor.107 In his spare time, Alberto wrote motivational lyrics and produced
his own music.108 He even found time to take some classes at a community
college; pursuant to sex offender registration regulations, however, he was required
to alert the administration of his status as a sex offender and eventually dropped out
96. Id.
97. Hartgrove Hospital, Psychological Screening Evaluation, A.M., June 11, 2001 (on file with
authors); Juvenile Court of Cook County, Supplemental Social Investigation, A.M., Aug. 13, 2001
[hereinafter Supplemental Social Investigation, Aug. 13, 2001] (on file with authors).
98. Supplemental Social Investigation, Aug. 13, 2001, supra note 97, at 4.
99. Juvenile Court of Cook County, Supplemental Social Investigation, A.M., Feb. 13, 2002, at 4
(on file with authors).
100. Id.
101. Monthly Case Log, A.M., Jan. 2002-July 2005 (on file with authors).
102. Juvenile Court of Cook County, Sexual Offense Risk Assessment, Sept. 1, 2010, at 4 (on file
with authors).
103. Id.at 14.
104. Id.at 4.
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id.
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because he felt ostracized.109 All told, Alberto was eagerly looking forward to July
2010, when he was due to complete his sex offender registration requirements. At
that time, he felt that he finally would be able to move beyond his past life.
In late 2009, however, Alberto learned something very troubling. At that time,
law enforcement informed him that his registration was not due to be terminated
and that he was going to have to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.110
Alberto was shocked, as he recalled his lawyer specifically informing him that his
registration duties would last only ten years.111 That ten-year limit had been a
crucial factor in Alberto’s choice to plead guilty, as his counsel had thoroughly
relayed how arduous and embarrassing the registration requirements were.112
Alberto immediately sought the advice of counsel, hoping that he could either
terminate his registration requirements or somehow prove his innocence and get the
charges vacated.
Alberto’s counsel—who are the authors of this article—soon determined that
under applicable Illinois law, the offense to which Alberto had pled did in fact
require lifetime registration, even though Alberto had been a juvenile.113 After
ordering the court file and transcripts, however, counsel soon discovered that
Alberto was never informed of this. To the contrary, the juvenile court judge’s
guilty plea admonishments specifically stated that Alberto was only required to
register for ten years.114 A boilerplate court form, signed and initialed by Alberto,
said the same thing.115 Counsel also interviewed Alberto’s former public defender;
while she had no specific recollection of the case, she did recall some confusion
about the length of his sex offender registration obligations. In a notarized
affidavit, Alberto swore that his counsel informed him that the requirements would
last just ten years and that he relied on this information in choosing to plead
guilty.116
At the same time, counsel began to investigate Alberto’s claim of innocence by
speaking to Alberto’s younger brother Evan, the alleged victim. Alberto had
warned his counsel that he did not know what Evan was going to say, given that the
family never had spoken much about the alleged incident. When counsel met with
Evan, who was now an eighteen-year-old high school senior, Evan stated without
hesitation that the assault never happened.117 He told a similar story to Alberto’s,
in which their mother had overreacted when she saw the two brothers playing
naked in a family member’s pool.118 He recalled being questioned as a nine-yearold by multiple police officers about whether Alberto had assaulted him in a sexual
way and remembered fearing that he was going to go to jail.119 Evan could not
109. Id.
110. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, supra note 93, at Ex. D.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A-5), (E)(1) (2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/7; 1999 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 91-48 (West) (effective July 1, 1999).
114. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, supra note 93.
115. Id.
116. Id. at Ex. D.
117. Affidavit of E.M., April 30, 2010 (on file with authors).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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actually recall whether he ultimately had told the police that Alberto had assaulted
him, but he repeatedly declared that even if he did make that statement, it wasn’t
true: his brother had never sexually assaulted him in any way.120 Evan signed a
notarized affidavit attesting to this story and promised to testify consistently in
court if he was ever called to do so.121
Armed with this new evidence, Alberto was geared up to pursue relief in the
Illinois courts. His counsel intended to raise a claim of actual innocence based on
Evan’s affidavit as well as due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims
based on the affirmative misinformation that Alberto’s attorney had told him about
the length of his registration requirements.122
These efforts, however, were soon stymied. Alberto’s attorney discovered that
Illinois law precluded juveniles from filing petitions under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act,123 the traditional means by which a criminal defendant raises nonforensic claims of actual innocence or constitutional violations based on newly
discovered evidence.124 Instead, the only way for Alberto to pursue any sort of
collateral relief in juvenile court was to file a so-called petition for relief from final
order, a traditional civil remedy that must be raised within one year of the date of
adjudication.125 One year, of course, had long since passed. When Alberto
attempted nevertheless to file claims under this statute, a juvenile court judge
refused to entertain his claims, citing the time limitation.126 Despite the fact that
Alberto had evidence of his innocence; that his guilty plea had been extracted
based on misinformation from his defense attorney, the prosecutor, and even the
judge; and that the delay in raising these issues was in no way Alberto’s fault,
Alberto had no legal vehicle for presenting his claims to the court.127
B. Robert Taylor and Jonathan Barr
On the afternoon of November 19, 1991, fourteen-year-old Cateresa Matthews
was on her way home from school in the close-knit, south Chicago suburb of
Dixmoor.128 Just as she did every day, Cateresa walked from Rosa L. Parks Middle
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Indeed, the substance of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim appeared to have merit, as the
U.S. Supreme Court had recently ruled that an adult immigrant who pled guilty to a criminal offense
after his counsel wrongly advised him that his conviction would not affect his immigration status could
establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). Alberto could
have argued that affirmative misadvice about sex offender registration status was at least as important a
collateral matter as immigration consequences and thus that the same result should lie.
123. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 to 122-8 (2012).
124. In re William M., 795 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ill. 2003).
125. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-32 (2012).
126. In re A.M., Order, July 26, 2010.
127. Alberto’s story does have a happy ending. Although Alberto was never able to prove his
innocence in court, he applied to be removed from the sex offender registry through an Illinois statute
that permits certain adjudicated juveniles to terminate their registration obligations early. See 730 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 150/3-5 (2012). On March 2, 2011, Alberto was removed from the sex offender registry.
A.M., Court Order, March 2, 2011. In total, he spent roughly eight more months on the registry than he
was instructed he would have to spend.
128. Motion for Forensic Testing Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/116-3, at 2-3, People v. Harden, No. 92 CR
27247 [hereinafter Dixmoor DNA Motion] (on file with authors); Joint Petition For Relief From
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School to her great-grandmother’s house, where she ate a home-cooked meal.129
After bidding her great-grandmother goodbye, she walked to a nearby city bus stop,
where she usually caught the bus that took her home.130 Inexplicably, however,
Cateresa never arrived home. As the afternoon stretched into the evening, her
mother placed several increasingly frantic telephone calls to the local police,
hospitals, and Cateresa’s friends and schoolmates—all to no avail. The next
morning, Cateresa was still nowhere to be found.
Nearly three weeks later, Cateresa was still considered a missing person by
authorities when a Dixmoor resident named Jesus Novoa made a shocking
discovery. On the afternoon of December 8, Novoa was walking along a grassy
area next to Interstate 57, which ran through his residential neighborhood.131
Along a foot-hewn path that ran through tall grasses, he stumbled across the body
of Cateresa Matthews.132 She was lying on her back with her pants removed and
her underwear dangling off one ankle.133 A spent .25-caliber bullet casing sat on
her chest.134 She had been shot in the mouth.135
After Novoa and his family members called the police, crime scene
investigators arrived on the scene. Almost immediately, they concluded that
Cateresa had been killed recently. Her body did not show signs of decomposition
or animal predation, as would be expected after three weeks in an open field.136
Blood was still draining from her body, also suggesting a recent death.137 And
rigor mortis, which usually disappears within 36 hours of death, was present in her
limbs.138 Based on these observations, the medical examiner concluded that she
had been killed on the day her body was discovered: December 8, 1991.139
Because her body was found on state property adjacent to an interstate
highway, the Illinois State Police assumed control of the case. Their investigation,
however, led nowhere. After canvassing the neighborhood and interviewing
Cateresa’s friends and relatives, police were at an apparent loss for leads.
Judgment, Immediate Vacation of Convictions, and Release of Petitioners On Their Own Recognizance,
at 3, People v. Harden, No. 92 CR 27247 [hereinafter Dixmoor Motion to Vacate]. As was the case with
Alberto, the authors of this article represented Robert Taylor during post-conviction proceedings. Some
information included herein arises from their personal knowledge and experience with the case.
129. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 2-3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128,
at 3.
130. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at
3.
131. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 2-3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128,
at 3.
132. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 2-3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128,
at 3.
133. See Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 3.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at
3-4.
137. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at
3-4.
138. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at
3-4.
139. See Direct Appeal Brief and Argument for Defendants-Appellants, at 8-10, People v. Harden,
No. 95-3905 [hereafter Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief].
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Beginning in late February 1992, police reports reflect an eight-month period of
law enforcement inactivity as Cateresa’s murder transformed from an electrifying
crime into just another cold case.
That changed in October 1992, when reports reflect that a fifteen-year-old
student from Rosa Parks Middle School brought police new information.
According to those reports, this young informant told police that another fifteenyear-old classmate, Jonathan Barr, had told him that he had seen Cateresa getting
into a car with two other teens named Robert Taylor and Robert Lee Veal on the
day she disappeared.140 Interestingly, Barr was the younger brother of Cateresa’s
ex-boyfriend James Harden. Both Barr and Harden lived only a half-block away
from where Cateresa’s body had been found.
Armed with this information, the police brought Robert Lee Veal to the local
State’s Attorney’s Office for questioning nine days later. Like Barr and Taylor,
Veal was also fifteen; but unlike them, he suffered from severe learning disabilities
and was generally considered slow.141 Despite his limitations, police interrogated
Veal about the crime without a parent or guardian present.142 After several hours of
questioning, Veal agreed to sign a statement that was written out by law
enforcement.143 In that statement, Veal admitted to participating in the gang-rape
and murder of Cateresa Matthews, along with four other teens: Jonathan Barr,
fifteen-year-old Robert Taylor, seventeen-year-old James Harden, and seventeenyear-old Shainne Sharp.144
The police arrested and interrogated Robert Taylor next. Again, after hours of
interrogation, Taylor did as Veal had done: he signed a statement written out by
law enforcement in which he admitted to participating in the gang-rape and murder
of Cateresa with the same group of teens.145 Two days later, police interrogated
Shainne Sharp under similar circumstances; after enduring nearly a day of
questioning without a parent or attorney present, he too signed a similar
statement.146
The three inculpatory statements all admitted to the same basic nexus of
events: an assault on Cateresa in the field where her body was found in which at
least four of the five boys raped her and James Harden shot her.147 The three
accounts wildly diverged, however, when it came to the surrounding events.
Taylor described being picked up from school by a car containing the other four
boys and Cateresa; the group then allegedly drove directly to the field where the
140. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at
4; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 139, at 13.
141. See Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 139, at 13.
142. Id.
143. See Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 5; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note
139, at 13-14.
144. See Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 5; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note
139, at 13-14.
145. See Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 5; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note
139, at 13-14.
146. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3-4; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128,
at 5.
147. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3-4; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128,
at 4-5.
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assault occurred.148 Sharp described being picked up from a basketball game by a
car containing Taylor, Harden, and Veal—although he didn’t know Veal’s name
and called him simply “the light-skinned dude”—and then being driven to
Harden’s house to play dice, where Barr and Cateresa joined them.149 For his part,
Veal described being picked up on his way home from a local candy store by
Taylor, Harden, and Sharp, who were in a car together; a few minutes later, they
also picked up Barr and Cateresa and supposedly drove straight to the crime
scene.150 All three teens, however, agreed on one key fact. According to all three
confessions, the assault and murder happened on the same day that Cateresa
disappeared: November 19, 1991.
Following the confessions, all five teens were arrested and charged with a host
of offenses, including Cateresa’s sexual assault and murder. As the defendants
awaited trial, law enforcement decided to take one further investigative step in
order to corroborate the confessions with physical evidence: using then-nascent
DNA testing techniques, they asked the Illinois State Police Crime Lab to compare
the DNA from the semen left inside Cateresa’s body against the DNA of the
charged boys.151 That scientific testing, however, left law enforcement with two
surprising results. First, it turned out that the DNA had been left by a single
male— not by four or five different individuals, as would be consistent with the
three confessions.152
Second, and even more notably, scientific testing
conclusively established that the semen had not been left by any of the five charged
teens. Instead, it belonged to some unknown man.153
Despite this startling result, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office
barreled forward with all five prosecutions. Because of their ages, Taylor and Barr
had to be charged in juvenile court, meaning that they faced far less prison time if
they were adjudicated delinquent. The State of Illinois, however, proceeded to file
motions requesting their transfer to adult criminal court, where they would face
sentences of life in prison. After hearing argument, the juvenile court judge made a
shocking decision: despite the seriousness of the charged offenses, he declined to
transfer Taylor and Barr’s cases to adult criminal court.154 In so concluding, he
reasoned that despite the existence of multiple written confessions, there was not
sufficient evidence such that a grand jury would be expected to issue an indictment
in adult proceedings.155 Key to his decision was the fact that the three confessions
simply got the date of Cateresa’s death wrong: “How could they charge these guys
with killing and raping this girl on November 19? She didn’t die until December
8.”156
The State immediately appealed this decision and the Illinois Appellate Court

148. See Confession of Robert Taylor, October 29, 1992 (on file with authors).
149. Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 6-7.
150. Id.
151. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 5; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at
5; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 139, at 14-15.
152. See Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 128, at 14-15.
153. Id.
154. See In re R.T. & J.B., 648 N.E. 2d 1043, 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1046.
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reversed, sending Taylor and Barr’s cases straight to adult criminal court.157 With
all five teenage defendants now facing adult time, the State was in a powerful
position. Prosecutors accordingly offered Sharp and Veal sweetheart deals: if they
pled guilty and testified against Harden, Taylor, and Barr, they would serve only
about eight more years in prison.158 Both Sharp and Veal accepted the deals, and
based on their testimony (and, in Taylor’s case, on his confession), Harden, Taylor,
and Barr were convicted as adults and sentenced to the equivalent of life in
prison.159
Some seventeen years later, attorneys for Harden, Taylor, and Barr (including
the authors of this article, who represented Robert Taylor) filed post-conviction
motions for DNA testing.160 During those seventeen years, law enforcement had
constructed the national CODIS database, which contains the DNA profiles of
various criminal offenders and other individuals.161 Although it was already known
that the DNA left on Cateresa’s body did not belong to the defendants, defense
attorneys reasoned that perhaps the DNA donor could finally be identified. After
the trial court agreed to grant the motions, the DNA testing proceeded, and on
March 9, 2011, it was finally learned that the DNA belonged to a man named
Willie Randolph.
Additional investigation revealed damning information about Randolph. At
the time of Cateresa’s murder, he had been thirty-three years old—much older than
the five convicted defendants or the victim.162 He had lived, moreover, only a mile
away from Cateresa’s great-grandmother’s house in Dixmoor.163 And he had a
history of sexual violence. In 1977, Randolph had been convicted for raping a
woman on the street.164 Perhaps most strikingly, when he was in his early twenties,
he also reportedly sexually assaulted his thirteen-year-old girlfriend in the very
same field in which Cateresa’s body was later found in 1991.165
Armed with this new evidence, defense attorneys filed post-conviction motions
to vacate the convictions of all five of the convicted defendants.166 After the State
eventually dropped its opposition to those motions, the court vacated the
convictions of Harden, Taylor, and Barr on November 3, 2011—only sixteen days
shy of the twentieth anniversary of Cateresa’s disappearance.167 Now in their midthirties, Harden, Taylor, and Barr were immediately released from prison; within

157. Id. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in considering the State’s likely
success at trial during the transfer hearing. Id.
158. Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 6.
159. Id. at 9.
160. See, e.g., Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128.
161. See id. at 2.
162. Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 10.
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id. at 10.
165. See Petitioners’ Motion To Admit Evidence of Willie Randolph’s Other Crimes and Bad Acts,
at 4, Ex. B, People v. Harden, No. 92 CR 27247. Charges were never filed in connection with this
alleged assault. See id.
166. Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128.
167. Steve Mills & Andy Grimm, Prosecutors Vacate Charges for 5 Who Served Years for Rape,
Killing of 14-year-old Girl, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2011,http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-1104/news/ct-met-dna-murder-rape-20111104_1_dixmoor-case-dna-tests-dna-evidence.
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weeks, the guilty pleas and convictions of Sharp and Veal, who had long ago
finished their reduced prison sentences, were vacated too. As of the writing of this
article, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office has not filed charges against
Willie Randolph in connection with the death of Cateresa Matthews.
The story of these five defendants carries, at the least, the satisfaction of
knowing that a long-festering injustice was corrected, albeit decades too late,
through post-conviction proceedings. But the frightening corollary to that reality is
the knowledge that in Illinois, such a resolution might not have been available for
Taylor and Barr if their cases had remained in juvenile court as the original judge
had ordered. The Illinois statutory provision that enabled them to file their motion
for DNA testing—chapter 725, act 5, section 116-3 of the Illinois Compiled
Statutes—permits a defendant to move for forensic testing in the trial court that
entered judgment on his or her “conviction.” Generally speaking, Illinois
jurisprudence has distinguished between juveniles “adjudicated delinquent” in
juvenile court and adults “convicted” in criminal court.168 Juveniles, for instance,
are not permitted to file post-conviction petitions under the Illinois Post-Conviction
Hearing Act.169 While no case in Illinois has yet extended this reasoning to postconviction motions for DNA testing, that legal vehicle may well be deemed
unavailable to juveniles too; at minimum, it is unclear whether juveniles have
access to DNA testing after their adjudications. Thus, despite the righteousness of
their cause, access to the exonerating power of post-conviction DNA testing could
easily have been denied to Taylor and Barr if their cases had remained in juvenile
court—a sad irony, given that the institution of juvenile court was intended to
provide extra protections for juveniles.
IV. CONCLUSION
In most ways, of course, Alberto was very lucky that his case was adjudicated
in juvenile court rather than transferred to adult criminal court. The charges against
him were very serious and could have carried up to thirty years in prison if he had
been convicted in criminal court.170 Robert Taylor and Jonathan Barr, for their
part, were equally unlucky: had their cases remained in juvenile court, they would
have been out of prison no later than their twenty-first birthdays instead of
languishing behind bars until their mid-thirties for a crime they did not commit.
On the other hand, Illinois laws prevented Alberto from pursuing his innocence
post-adjudication or arguing that he had received constitutionally deficient counsel
because he was tried in juvenile court, while Robert and Jonathan were able to
clear their names only because they were subjected to the jurisdiction and penalties
of criminal court. Such a result is nothing short of perverse.
Because juveniles like Alberto, Robert, and Jonathan face a heightened risk of
wrongful conviction and a potentially heightened risk of ineffective assistance of
counsel—and because the direct and collateral consequences of delinquency
adjudications can be severe—it is fair, just, and urgently necessary for legislatures
168. See People v. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ill. 2006).
169. See, e.g., In re A.W.H., 420 N.E.2d 1041, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
170. Aggravated criminal sexual assault is a Class X felony that carries a sentencing range of 6-30
years in prison. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14(d) (2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-25.
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to amend collateral remedy statutes to ensure access for adjudicated juveniles. The
required amendment is uncomplicated: in the context of DNA testing, the forty-one
jurisdictions that currently make relief available to those who have been
“convicted” of crimes should simply add the phrase “or adjudicated delinquent” to
their statutes. That is essentially what Colorado, the District of Columbia, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have done, and the addition of those
simple words has brought a dictionary’s worth of clarity to the law. Indeed, the
same thing can be done in statutes governing the availability of non-forensic
collateral remedies. These simple amendments will ensure that adjudicated
juveniles are given the same desperately needed access to collateral proceedings
that convicted adults receive.
One Virginia legislator is more than doing his part. Moved by the story of
Virginia teen Edgar Coker, Jr., Republican General Assembly Delegate Gregory D.
Habeeb has introduced legislation in Virginia that would actually increase
juveniles’ post-conviction access even above the level of access that convicted
adults typically receive.171 Edgar Coker, Jr. spent seventeen months in juvenile
detention—and still remains on the sex offender registry—after he pled guilty to
raping a fourteen-year-old peer.172 He entered the plea instead of risking adult
charges and a far greater sentence.173 Since that time, however, Edgar’s “victim”
has admitted that she lied about being raped and that she had consented to the
sex.174 She and her mother have been fighting to vacate Edgar’s adjudication and
remove him from the sex offender registry, but the Virginia courts have refused,
claiming that their jurisdiction ended once Edgar was no longer on parole.175
Delegate Habeeb has taken steps to correct this situation by introducing a bill that
would allow adjudicated juveniles who plead guilty to seek a post-conviction writ
of innocence; currently, neither adults nor juveniles who plead guilty may seek that
form of relief.176 In so doing, he has recognized the critical importance of juvenile
access to collateral proceedings.
Legislators, advocates, and other stakeholders throughout the country must
take similar steps to amend the law in their home jurisdictions to ensure that
juveniles and adults have equal access to collateral relief. For Alberto, Robert,
Jonathan, Edgar, and many more like them around the country, such steps could
represent huge advances in juveniles’ access to justice.
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